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Abstract 
Home energy retrofit is distinctive as a low carbon policy option because it often requires 
collaboration between private households and public policy in the deeply personal environment of 
the home. While there is a strong case for public investment in retrofit there is also a strong case for 
private investment, and as a result there is often a joint public-private contribution to its costs. This 
paper reports the results of a systematic evidence review and synthesis on policy effectiveness for 
private household investment in energy retrofit. The review considered how public policy can be 
used to effectively and efficiently leverage private household investment, across both demand-side 
and supply-side aspects. On the demand-side, the results show policy interventions leverage a wide 
range of private funding, from well below public funds, to several multiples of them. At the same 
time, calculating leverage is not straightforward, but involves various additionality, positive spill-over 
and market effects. In terms of different policy tools, subsidised loans offer the highest private to 
public leverage ratios, but are less attractive to households – and are less widely used – than one-off 
payment grants and tax incentives. The review highlights inadequate policy attention on the role of 
the supply-side in retrofit policy making, with missed opportunities for improved retrofit 
performance and sales. The paper also considers the effectiveness of the overall policy mix, in terms 
of stability, flexibility and simplicity. Finally, understanding policy effectiveness in complex systems 
such as household retrofitting requires a broad and realist approach to evidence review.   
Highlights 
- Large opportunity (and need) for private household investment in energy retrofit  
- Additionality, leverage and overall scale all contribute to policy effectiveness  
- Financial incentives: loans offer more leverage but are less attractive than grants 
- Effective policy requires a holistic ‘push-pull’ approach across demand and supply 
- Tension between efficiency and effectiveness in policy promoting private investment 
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List of abbreviations and key concepts 
• Additionality: the additionality of a retrofit programme is the proportion of the retrofit 
measures, energy savings or overall retrofit investment that occur as a result of the programme 
and that would not have occurred in the programme’s absence.  
• BBNP: Better Buildings Neighborhood Program, a USA policy programme incorporating over 
forty different state or local energy retrofit schemes. 
• EA: Energy Assessment. An assessment of a property’s current energy performance and/or 
potential for energy retrofit, carried out by a qualified professional. 
• EPC: Energy Performance Certificate 
• ESO: Energy Supplier Obligation, a government policy that obliges energy suppliers that conform 
to certain criteria e.g. number of customers, to instigate energy efficiency measures, normally 
extending outside their organisation. 
• Free-riding: beneficiaries of a retrofit programme that would have carried out the subsidised 
retrofit in the absence of the programme are considered to be free-riding. 
• GD: Green Deal. A UK policy programme running from 2012-2015 that involved on-bill financing 
for energy retrofit. 
• KfW: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, a German government-owned development bank that 
helps to facilitate retrofit incentive programmes 
• Leverage: the relative ratio of private to public funds deployed as the result of a policy 
programme 
• Non-participant spillover: retrofit that is carried out by households that did not participate in a 
retrofit programme, but which was stimulated by the retrofit programme’s impact on the overall 
retrofit market structure i.e. expansion of retrofit suppliers, and reduction in cost of retrofit 
supply. 
• OP: obligated parties. An energy supplier or other party that is obligated as part of an Energy 
Supplier Obligation (ESO) obligations as part of an Energy Supplier Obligation (ESO) 
• Participant spillover: retrofit that is carried out by the participant in a retrofit programme, that is 
additional and at a later date to that which was facilitated by their participation in the retrofit 
programme 
• RMI: Repair, Maintenance and Improvement. General, amenity, non-energy home improvement 
or renovation. 
• SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
1. Introduction 
Given its potential to mitigate the impacts of climate change, alleviate fuel poverty and address a 
number of other social and economic policy objectives  there is a clear case for the public funding of 
home energy retrofit [1]. Home energy retrofit can involve improvement in a building’s fabric to 
reduce heat loss e.g. through insulation of walls, the addition of double or triple glazing etc., or 
improvement in the efficiency of an energy using technology e.g. a gas or oil boiler. The public policy 
rationale is complemented by a private household rationale, given the benefits that accrue solely to 
the homeowner, such as the potential for a warmer, more comfortable home, lower energy bills and 
other private benefits.  
Retrofit policy and activity span different types of households, including those that rent privately, 
those in some form of social housing and those that are owner-occupiers. Owner-occupation is often 
the largest tenure type in the overall housing stock – the majority of homes in each EU member 
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state are owner occupied [2] – and presents a distinctive challenge for retrofit policy. A large 
proportion of owner-occupiers are deemed ‘able to pay’: to contribute to the cost of retrofit. This 
paper reports research focused on the potential contribution to overall retrofit of able-to-pay 
owner-occupiers.  
A wide variety of policy options can be used to encourage retrofit investment by owner-occupiers. 
Historically, policy efforts in many countries have tended to favour a liberal economic approach, 
involving market mechanisms and information provision, rather than regulatory standards that 
enforce change [3,4]. While market-based policies have helped to deliver considerable increases in 
energy retrofit in many countries in recent years, they have typically been implemented on a cost-
effective-first basis [5], and as a result the most economically viable retrofit has been prioritised – 
progressively diminishing the economics of future retrofit opportunities [6]; even so, there are often 
considerable remaining opportunities [7].  
In some jurisdictions, there are specific targets for the level of retrofit installation, while other policy 
contexts seek improved levels without a defined target. In Scotland, for example, the recently 
launched Energy Efficient Scotland route map [8] sets out an ambition for a potential £10 billion 
investment in energy efficiency in buildings over its 20-year lifetime. Although precise levels of 
investment are uncertain, available public funding is likely to be well below this figure; less than £1 
billion is available over the next 5 years [8]. There is, therefore, a looming investment gap between 
available public funds and the anticipated overall investment needed – a gap that could be partly 
met by owner-occupiers, which make up over half (58%) of the Scottish housing stock [9]. In this 
context, retrofit policy can be assessed in terms of how effectively it addresses overall objectives for 
energy/carbon savings, fuel poverty alleviation and so on, but also in terms of how efficiently it 
leverages private investment, and the extent to which it supports additional retrofit beyond that 
which would have happened irrespectively.  
In retrofit studies, the term ‘leverage’ refers to mobilising private funding using public funds [10]. 
The principle of public funds being used to leverage additional private investment is relevant to 
other areas of finance, particularly broader climate finance, but also international development 
financing [10,11]. The gap between official targets for retrofit and available public funds can mean 
that there is an expectation (implicit or explicit) for private investment, and, although not routinely 
measured, the degree of leverage initiated by publically funded programmes can be used as a means 
of assessing the programme’s effectiveness [12,13]. 
 
This paper focuses on policy interventions that seek to facilitate a contribution from private 
households to home energy retrofit, and reviews evidence of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different types of policy instruments in this area. We report the findings of a systematic review of 
the evidence on the relationship between private and public contributions, and how policy can be 
designed to more effectively enhance private investment.  
We first outline the particular approach to systematic evidence review adopted here. We then 
assess historic evidence of relative private and public investment levels and how these should be 
quantified. From this base, the study considers a mix of evidence on the effectiveness of different 
policy instruments, including formal evaluations of policy and more qualitative and ‘opinion-based’ 
studies involving expert interviews and focus groups. Finally, we consider the implications of the 




2. Design and Methods  
From a systematic evidence review perspective, our study addressed a relatively broad policy 
question: ‘How can public policy more effectively encourage private, ‘able to pay’ households to 
invest in energy efficient retrofit?’ In order to address this broad question, our research design 
involved an adapted approach to systematic evidence review spanning multiple relevant factors. 
This included evidence on both how effective and how efficient different approaches to policy have 
been in attracting private investment (in terms of additionality and leverage), but also the reasons 
why policy may or may not function effectively and efficiently, in terms of demand- and supply-side 
factors, and overall policy dynamics.   
2.1. Stage 1: scoping literature review  
An initial scoping literature review was undertaken to identify the key themes in the evidence base 
and provide structure to the process of evidence synthesis. We adopted a ‘realist’ approach [14–16] 
entailing the identification of ‘candidate’ themes which could be adapted during the full review, if it 
became clear that it was more appropriate to address a modified theme with the gathered evidence. 
The ultimate themes used to structure the evidence review were:  
1. Private household investment and public policy 
2. Demand-side: policies aimed at households 
3. Supply-side: policies aimed at actors involved with the delivery of retrofit 
4. Overall policy mix dynamics 
 
2.2.  Stage 2: Full systematic evidence review  
Evidence collection, analysis and report drafting took place over 6 months. Our approach to 
systematic evidence gathering built on that used by the UK Energy Research Centre’s Technology 
and Policy Assessment function [17–19], but also drew on other similar approaches [20–22].  
With a few exceptions, we focussed on academic, peer-reviewed literature from a defined 
geography (Europe and North America) and history (2008-2017), partly due to the pragmatic 
necessity of bounding the evidence base, while also ensuring maximum relevance.  
Clearly, evidence from a particular case in a particular context is not automatically transferable to 
other contexts, but a systematic collection of evidence may nevertheless offer some indicative 
lessons on policy effectiveness. The transferability or otherwise of international case evidence is a 
key issue in the policy transfer literature (e.g. [23–25]). We discuss this issue in the context of our 
evidence base in Section 4.  
As well as peer-reviewed academic evidence, there is considerable non-academic, ‘grey’ literature of 
relevance to our review. Gathering this non-academic evidence was partly addressed by the next 
stage of the method (stage 3) but a lack of comprehensive analysis of the grey literature base, is a 
limitation of the study. Our focus on mostly academic literature – a common approach in systematic 
evidence reviews (e.g. [26]) was ultimately deemed necessary as a means of bounding the evidence 
gathering stage. We gathered evidence from widely used Scopus and Web of Science academic 
search engines, using the following search terms: 
Table 1: Evidence review search terms  
Policy related terms Retrofit related terms Policy effectiveness related 
terms 
Policy Energy Effective 
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Energy Efficiency Effectiveness 
Effective Retrofit Evaluation 
Program(me) Private Assessment 
 Investment  
 Household  
 
This search phase generated almost 1000 ‘in-scope’ academic papers. The titles and abstracts of 
these papers were reviewed and ranked in terms of their relevance to the review question. 
Ultimately, 81 articles were given a full reading. The gathered evidence was a mix of original 
empirical studies on the impact of policy programmes, alongside more ‘advocacy’ based findings 
arising from expert interviews and focus groups.  
Articles that received a full reading were coded using the following criteria: 
 Geographic region: to what geographic context / policy jurisdiction does the evidence apply? 
 Policy option: what specific form(s) of policy intervention were under investigation? 
 Time period: year of publication and period of implementation or assessment of the policy 
programme 
2.3. Stage 3: Expert Group peer-review  
 
Policy-relevant applied research often lacks the “accumulation of knowledge that characterizes 
organized areas of scientific investigation” [27]. In place, an expert peer-review process can be used 
to assess and verify contextual evidence. Our draft evidence review was subject to peer review from 
several project advisors and topic experts, representing a range of senior academic, policy and 
stakeholder perspectives. Due to the breadth of the topic, it was not possible to present an 
exhaustive survey of evidence on each of the themes. The expert peer review process allowed 
critical review of the initial evidence synthesis, but also directed the analysis toward additional 
relevant evidence, academic and non-academic. 
Feedback from the draft review report highlighted additional evidence, including ‘grey’, non-
academic sources, and these were added to the evidence base to more comprehensively address the 
review question. Following peer review, a further three months was spent considering additional 
evidence. The final review spanned 58 sources: 50 peer-reviewed academic papers, 1 conference 
paper, and 7 ‘grey’ literature documents. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Private and public contributions to the cost of retrofit  
The first section of the review addresses how policy effectiveness for private household investment 
in retrofit should be quantitatively assessed. It first considers evidence on additionality: the 
effectiveness of retrofit policy, in terms of the extent that it facilitates additional retrofit or whether 
it supports retrofit that would have taken place irrespectively. It then addresses the extent to which 
policy leverages private household investment i.e. policy efficiency. 
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3.1.1. Additionality: does public policy encourage ‘additional’ private investment in retrofit? 
The ‘additionality’ of a specific retrofit policy programme can be expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of retrofit measures, estimated energy saved or retrofit investment spend that would 
not have occurred in the absence of the programme. The measures, energy savings or retrofit 
investment that would have otherwise occurred can be termed the ‘free-riding’ component. 
In the USA the term free-riding is not normally used; instead, efficiency programmes distinguish 
between ‘gross’ and ‘net’ energy savings using the Net-to-Gross (NTG) ratio [28]. There are different 
approaches to estimating NTG, reflecting the inclusion or exclusion of ‘participant’ and ‘non-
participant’ spillovers. Participant spillovers entail retrofit measures implemented by participants in 
the programme, but for measures which do not receive any direct public subsidy. Non-participant 
spillover occurs when a policy programme is assessed as having changed the wider market structure, 
in a way that increased overall retrofit uptake [29]. These direct and indirect effects can be 
summarised in terms of energy savings: 
Net Savings = Gross Savings - Free Rider Based Savings + Participant Spillovers + Non-
Participant Spillovers  
 
Additionality and spillovers are difficult to estimate, and the shortcomings of assessment methods 
are widely accepted in additionality estimation research [29–31]. Estimation is often carried out via 
self-report surveys, although econometric methods such as logic/ranking/discrete choice modelling 
can be used. Econometric approaches are generally considered preferable, but are more costly and 
rely on the availability of appropriate data [29].  
The introduction of any policy instrument (financial incentive, information-based, regulatory etc.) 
will likely result in retrofit that is part additional and part not. It will also result in positive spillovers 
not directly supported by the programme. The evidence on additionality reported here relates only 
to financial incentives that cover the direct cost of retrofit, rather than wider retrofit related policies.  
Table 2 summarises the additionality and NTG estimates included in this review. The Table indicates 
that additionality tends to be lower for retrofit that entails the ‘replacement’ of existing building 
components i.e. heating system technologies and building fabric components such as doors and 
windows. In Italy, Alberini et al (2014) found almost 100% free-riding on a scheme that offered 
subsidies for replacement boilers, while a similar scheme for replacement windows offered 30-40% 
additionality. In France, Nauleau (2014) found higher additionality with respect to insulation (walls, 
roofs etc.): 23-58%, than for windows: 15-39%. More free-riding should also be expected when a 
subsidy is applied to products that go through a regular replacement cycle, such as boilers, as 
opposed to ones that are new or ‘supplementary’ such as new insulation. The non-academic ‘grey’ 
literature on additionality (which tends to focus on the USA) also highlights different levels of 
additionality for different types of measure [28,31]. 
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*Additionality in these estimates is typically measured with respect to energy savings. 
Participant spillover is thought to be of lesser impact than non-participant spillover. In a review of 
energy efficiency programme evaluations in the USA, participant spillover was normally estimated at 
less than 5%, while non-participant spillover estimates ranged from 5% to 100% [29]. The Energy 
Trust in the USA currently apply a 7% value for non-participant spillover for programmes relating to 
existing buildings.  
 
3.1.2. Leverage: relative private and public investment  
As with additionality, leverage may be defined in different ways in different analyses, and can be 
estimated in relation to any policy instrument that uses public funds to stimulate private investment. 
However, it is usually defined solely with respect to financial incentives (potentially from multiple 
public sources, including central government, energy supplier obligations, local authorities, etc.), 
with the leverage ratio defined as the ratio of private-to-public funds deployed. Table 3 contains 
leverage ratio estimates included in this evidence review. 




Leverage (private funding as % of 
public funding) 
Source 
UK, ESO - 2002-2005 79% 
[13] 
UK, ESO - 2005-2008 55% 
France, ESO and Tax credits – 
2006 - 2009 
37% 
Denmark, ESO - 2011 240% 




USA, PACE loan scheme – 2011-
2012 
320% 
Germany, KfW loan scheme – 
pre 2011 
400% [38] 
* Some estimates specifically include only additional retrofit, while others do not refer to levels of additionality. Not all 
leverage studies here offer indirect cost estimates and the decision to only include direct costs in the review was made to 
provide directly comparable figures. The leverage calculations involve only direct costs and do not include public funds used 
to cover the development, administration or marketing of retrofit policy programmes. 
UK data: includes only data for the ‘able to pay’ population in the programme. Includes third party contributions i.e. 
housing association, local authority, in overall public funds. Data relates to private funding contributions that are 
additional, assuming 80% programme additionality.  
France data: data applies to whole population, with no focus on priority or able to pay populations. Includes energy supplier 
obligations and tax credit programme contributions to overall public funds. Programme assumes 100% additionality.  
Denmark data: data applies to whole population, with no focus on priority or able to pay populations. The estimates 
assume that 10% of the retrofit measures supported by the programme were additional.  
USA data: data applies to whole population, with no focus on priority or able to pay populations. Assumed 86% 
additionality.  
Germany data: data applies to whole population, with no focus on priority or able to pay populations. Additionality 
estimates unknown. 
The wide variation in leverage ratios in Table 3 to some extent reflects whether the scheme has a 
focus on certain priority social groups (e.g. low income or elderly households) which are less able to 
make a private contribution to the cost of retrofit. This is the case, for example, with respect to UK 
schemes, where a significant portion of public funds are ring-fenced for allocation to vulnerable 
groups; by contrast, the equivalent German loan scheme has a much lower proportion of ring-fenced 
funds [1]. Despite these limitations, the findings provide an example of the relative contributions to 
the cost of retrofit that can be made by private and public sources. Other possible reasons for the 
wide variation in leverage ratios in different countries are discussed later in the paper. 
 
3.2. Demand-side support: retrofit policies aimed at households 
3.2.1. Financial incentives 
A range of financial incentives are used to stimulate household energy retrofit activity, often in 
combination, so that assessing the effectiveness of any one type of incentive can be problematic. 
Grants are probably the most widespread form of support internationally [39,40]– their simplicity is 
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a key factor in their appeal [39]. Tax incentives are another popular form of incentive, although they 
have less ‘reach’, as not all households pay all taxes, and the saliency of the tax to households is an 
important factor in their effectiveness [41]. Unlike grants, tax incentives are ordinarily received after 
the retrofit investment has been made, and so do not address the barrier of a prohibitive upfront 
investment cost [42]. Grants or tax incentives linked to energy savings have been found to be less 
appealing to households than a fixed incentive [43]. 
Loans have a range of design features that can be adjusted to make them more attractive e.g. lower 
interest rates or different repayment terms [44]. Policy options here include the use of public funds 
to ‘buy-down’ the commercial interest rates, or loan guarantees or loan loss reserves to cover some 
of the lender’s risk, with the intention of reducing interest rates. Several studies suggest that loans 
are less attractive to households than ‘non-repayment’ incentives such as grants or tax-incentives; 
although non-repayment incentives tend to generate lower leverage ratios than loans [39,45,46].   
A common means of administering financial incentives is via the use of energy supplier obligations 
(ESOs), under which registered suppliers are required to provide support to households for energy 
retrofit measures. An important issue here is that ESOs often focus on the most cost-effective 
retrofit measures [47–49], leading to the pursuit of short-term, inexpensive measures, rather than 
those with a higher upfront cost but a longer lasting impact [50,51].  
 
Rohde et al. [13] found that leverage ratios in Danish ESOs were much higher than in UK and French 
equivalents, as they offer support at the time of the regular maintenance cycle; the authors add, 
however, that this has negative implications for the scheme’s additionality, as “the higher the 
leverage factor, the lower the additionality” (p. 139). This highlights a tension or trade-off between 
retrofit policy efficiency (in terms of maximising the leverage of public funds) and overall 
effectiveness (in terms of maximising the additionality of public incentives). Obligated parties under 
a supplier obligation will seek to meet their obligations with minimum expenditure and thus focus 
on activities that are close to happening anyway in order to maximise private household 
contribution; they seek high leverage but are unconcerned with additionality.  
 
3.2.2. Information-based policy options: persuading households to retrofit 
A popular policy mechanism for offering households information on retrofit and its benefits is Energy 
Performance Certificates (EPCs). Despite their widespread use, however, evidence on the 
effectiveness of EPCs is mixed. For example, a large sample online survey (n=700) on the usefulness 
of EPCs in Denmark suggested that home owners do not perceive themselves as lacking knowledge 
on the energy efficiency of their home, or how to improve it [52]. Although the information in 
Danish EPCs was considered reliable, it was also too general and superficial to greatly influence 
homeowners’ energy retrofit practices; Christensen et al. [52] concluded that the usability of the 
recommendations should be improved by including DIY recommendations or guidance on finding 
qualified tradespersons. Murphy et al. [37, p.466] cite research by Gram-Hanssen et al. [53] that also 
highlights the weaknesses of the EPC as a stand-alone tool, adding that it ‘‘will only be effective if 
the prospective informees are sufficiently interested to want to help themselves to the packages on 
offer’’. 
Energy assessments are distinct from EPCs on account of their face-to-face (advisor to householder) 
element; even so, evidence of their effectiveness in promoting retrofit investment is again mixed. 
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For example, Murphy’s analysis of energy assessments in the Netherlands [54] compared the level of 
retrofit activity of a group that had an energy assessment with one that did not; no demonstrable 
impact was found: the control group carried out as many measures as the assessment group.  
The effectiveness of energy assessments for German households was analysed by Frondel and Vance 
[55]. They found some increase in energy retrofit after an assessment, but also, a wide diversity in 
how homeowners responded to assessments. The effect was not always positive: information 
sometimes led to households developing a more negative view of retrofit, if the assessed costs and 
benefits were less favourable than anticipated. 
In their review of household energy investment decision making decisions, Kastner and Stern 
[27]found face-to-face assessments had some positive influence on investment, but also highlighted 
the methodological difficulties, arguing that the value of energy assessments and consulting would 
be more accurately measured indirectly, via long-term observation, rather than by self-reporting by 
households. Kastner and Stern [27] also highlighted other studies in which the effectiveness of an 
energy assessment was seen to depend on the perceived credibility of the assessor. 
3.2.3. Demand-side policy package design  
Several sources make reference to the need for both ‘carrots and sticks’ in an overall demand-side 
policy package design [40,41,56]. Killip [57] highlights the ‘market transformation’ approach used 
effectively to promote condensing boilers in the UK, with financial incentives being followed, over 
time, by voluntary standards, and then mandatory ones. Such a ramping-up of minimum standards 
via regulations is routinely applied to new technologies, but is more problematic and less commonly 
seen in relation to building fabric. Killip [57] also suggests that voluntary standards should not only 
precede compulsory standards, but also be raised when compulsory standards are introduced, so as 
to promote further innovation. Regulations, although seen as necessary to improve standards, may 
lead to additional training and accreditation needs on the supply-side.  
Different retrofit policy instruments have the potential to reinforce or counteract one another, with 
their combined effectiveness potentially greater – or less – than the sum of their parts. Rosenow et 
al. [40] concluded that information measures, energy labelling schemes and standards can reinforce 
the effectiveness of all other instruments, while fiscal measures such as an energy or carbon tax can 
also act to reinforce other instruments (but are also seen as having greater political challenges). In a 
further paper Rosenow et al. [56] note that a single household is likely to be receptive to different 
retrofit support incentives at different times, and so a comprehensive policy package across 
different stages is required.  
Rohde et al. [13] highlight that leverage of private investment with public funds is much larger in 
Danish ESOs than in the UK and French equivalents due to the Danish scheme encouraging support 
at a renewal point (or ‘trigger point’) in the regular maintenance cycle. Weiss et al. [51] highlight a 
widespread observation: that the point of general home renovation is “the most opportune moment 
to make relatively inexpensive energy efficiency improvements”. Galvin [58], Bundgaard et al. [34] 
and Weiss et al. [51] argue that if retrofit takes place alongside general renovation its overall 
economic viability can be improved. Weiss et al. highlight the transfer of ownership as a potential 
‘trigger point’, while Caputo and Pasetti [59] identify the repair or replacement of a failed or 
obsolete component, such as a broken heating system, as an appropriate opportunity. The potential 
to link energy retrofit with general refurbishment and / or routine maintenance was also made in 
multiple UK-based studies (e.g. [60–62]. 
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Some experts support the idea of a ‘whole house’ approach to retrofit, given its promise to maximise 
overall cost efficiency and minimise householder hassle and disruption [63,64]. However, Fawcett 
[65] highlighted that many households find a whole house approach impractical, and are likely to be 
more attracted to retrofit measures that take place over time, spreading the cost and disruption. 
With such phased retrofit, it is important to consider the order and potential combinations of 
measures; ‘Low Carbon Retrofit Plans’, including all the different specific measures appropriate for a 
property, are a suggested means for organising retrofit over time and ensuring cost and energy 
savings efficiency [65].  
3.3. Supply-side: retrofit policies aimed at actors delivering retrofit  
3.3.1. Supply side actors 
As part of energy retrofit policy effectiveness, a number of studies highlight the importance of 
including those involved with supplying general renovations or refurbishment – so called ‘repair, 
maintenance and improvement’ (RMI) activities [60,66,67]. The vast majority of retrofit in the UK 
and USA takes place alongside general renovations [66], and seeing retrofit as a distinct activity 
artificially decontextualises it for many households. In the UK, expenditure on general RMI has been 
estimated to be around 20 times greater than on energy related retrofit [57].  
The supply of both energy retrofit and more general RMI involves multiple micro-firms which 
frequently operate in ‘temporary multi-firm configurations’ [68]. Several studies highlight the risk 
averse nature of the retrofit supply chains [57,67–70] with low margins instilling conservatism and 
impeding innovation [68]. Some authors cite a lack of trust in installers among households as 
prohibiting uptake [39,71], with high quality in retrofit practice seen as an important way to 
promote ‘word of mouth’ marketing [69].  
3.3.2. Policy and the supply-side 
There is some evidence that retrofit supply-side actors are overlooked or marginalised  in retrofit 
policy design[45,67]. In the UK, for example, the expectation has largely been that demand will 
stimulate supply [4], while in the USA, policy more effectively involved ‘push and pull’, 
simultaneously addressing supply and demand actors. Policy in the USA engages with homeowners 
and supply-side actors using a variety of ‘touch points’ (points of contact between the household 
and the those delivering retrofit) and trusted messengers, as a means of boosting the conversion 
rate – from assessments to installations. 
As highlighted earlier, several studies emphasise the value of linking energy retrofit with more 
general household renovations [51,52,58,60,66]. Owen et al. [67] outline the importance of 
installers and advisors from the general RMI sector for household decision making about low carbon 
technologies. Killip [70] estimates that almost half of the total RMI market presents opportunities for 
integrating energy retrofit measures.  
Given the risk averseness of the retrofit and renovation sectors, policy needs to offer incentives and 
solutions that reflect the installer’s business motivations. Gooding and Gul [69] advocate  increased 
dialogue between policy makers and private businesses, in terms of what is realistically deliverable. 
Gillich et al [4] found that the most effective policy programmes in the USA engaged with supply 
contractors on an ongoing basis, so that the perceived benefits of participating in a programme 
outweigh their costs, and compared favourably with a ‘business as usual’ approach [72]. 
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Workforce training and work inspection are seen as critical factors in several European studies 
[57,73–76]. Killip [77] highlighted the importance of an intermediary or ‘integrator’ body as a means 
of ensuring retrofit projects were effectively implemented. Gillich [4] highlighted the important 
supplier-householders bridging role of energy advisors in USA retrofit programmes. Such an 
approach is linked to the Community Based Social Marketing (CBSM) approach to retrofit, and the 
use of multiple ‘touch points’ in USA policy.  
Improved accreditation is another means of building trust in the supply chain [49,69,78]. Training is 
not just seen as important in terms of the detailed practices of installation, but also in the more 
general ways it can support ‘heightened customer service’ [69], and in raising interest in retrofit 
upgrades among homeowners [4].  
Wade et al. [79] highlight the importance of ensuring that supply-side actors are able to preserve 
their ‘hard-earned expert identity’; drawing on Janda and Parag [80], Wade et al. [79] stress that 
policy needs to consider how these actors can give greater consideration to energy issues. Following 
Owen et al [67], Wade et al. [81] also highlighted that supply chain actors such as plumbing and 
building merchants offer a useful point of contact for dispersed supply-side actors.  
3.4. The overall policy package: stability, flexibility and simplicity 
3.4.1. Policy stability  
A repeated theme from the international research on retrofit policy effectiveness was the 
importance of policy stability [4,39,73,75,82,83]. In the UK, Kern et al. [82] argue that the high 
‘churn’ in retrofit policy in the period 2000-2014 led to increased uncertainty for stakeholders and 
households, and a rapidly fluctuating policy environment hindered innovation and investment. 
The evidence suggests that policy stability is key for supply side actors as well as the demand side. 
Gooding and Gul [69] report that UK retrofit supply side actors suffered from a pattern of ‘boom and 
bust', and a longer term outlook was needed to make retrofit businesses and careers more 
attractive, thereby helping to address some of the issues with the low quality of many installations. 
Gillich et al. [4,72] highlight that contractors were unlikely to change their business models toward 
more energy efficient installations unless they were given more consistent policy signals about the 
long term benefits involved. Kempa and Moslener [44] note that a long term strategy has the 
potential to stimulate innovative practices and cost reductions in retrofit technologies and 
installations. 
Successfully engaging households in retrofit investment requires stable and predictable long term 
support schemes because refurbishment is often carried out in isolated episodes, one step at a time 
[51]. In Gooding and Gul’s analysis [69], a longer term policy outlook was associated with raised 
public awareness of the benefits of energy retrofit with a suggested stronger link between home 
energy performance and house prices. In her analysis of a tax credit policy instrument in France, 
Nauleau [33] also highlighted the benefits of policy consistency, simplicity and good 
communications. 
Whilst some degree of policy change is inevitable (and desirable, to respond to changing 
circumstances and opportunities), studies also highlight the importance of having a long term 
strategy [41]. Kempa and Moslener [44] note that a long term strategy has the potential to give rise 
to innovative practices and cost reductions. 
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One important feature of credible, long term policy making is stable funding, such as can be offered 
through the use of a dedicated fund for retrofit. In Germany, Weiss et al. [51] highlight the potential 
benefits of a stand-alone energy efficiency fund in helping to ensure the continuation of subsidy 
programmes and thus improving their saliency and coherence. Gouldson et al.’s [83] model of a 
‘revolving fund’ that is replenished via the receipt of a portion of forecast energy bill savings could 
help ensure stability, and depoliticise public expenditure.  
3.4.2. Policy flexibility 
While stable and credible retrofit support is repeatedly mentioned in research, a degree of policy 
flexibility is also called for – there is no value in policy stability if the overall package is ineffective. 
Policy flexibility matters both with respect to revising programmes over time, and also devising 
policy packages that are flexible enough to cater for the different characteristics of different 
households and regions.  
Murphy et al. [63] highlight the benefits of short-term review cycles for retrofit policy targets within 
long term stability, allowing for improvements and adjustments in policy design. The highly 
distributed and small scale nature of the retrofit industry may mean that regionally flexible policy 
implementation is appropriate. Gillich et al. [4] suggest that a significant aspect of the successes of 
the Better Buildings Neighborhood Program in the USA was its geographic (interstate and intrastate) 
flexibility. Interviews with supply-side actors suggest that the UK Green Deal may have performed 
better if it was able to make adaptations over time [69]. 
Hoicka et al. [43] argue that given different households respond differently to different programme 
designs, ‘one size fits all programmes’ should be avoided – instead, policy designers should target 
sub-sets of the population to achieve the desired outcomes. Such ‘market segmentation’ approaches 
are also advocated by others (e.g. [72]), but designing specific policies for specific groups may put 
pressure on government capacity, as well as being at odds with calls for policy simplicity and 
consistency; they also risk creating ‘post-code lotteries’, in terms of eroding universal access to 
funding support. 
3.4.3. Policy simplicity 
Curtin et al. [39] highlight several studies that suggest that grant application processes can be off-
putting for households, and conclude that simplicity in the application process was a ‘key success 
factor’. A similar observation was made by Weiss et al. [51] with respect to policy successes in 
Germany, especially for loans at local banks and among households with little previous interest in 
energy conservation. In an analysis of a broad set of energy efficiency policies in Malaysia, Hor and 
Rahmat [84] conclude that a tax incentive scheme for residential and commercial buildings received 
only a small number of applications because of its lengthy and cumbersome approval process. 
 
4. Summary and Discussion 
Due to the considerable public goods benefits associated with a more energy efficient housing stock, 
there is a strong case for public funding to cover much of the cost of home energy retrofitting. The 
extent of the public contribution is, however, uncertain, and contingent on political priorities and 
the appeal of retrofit relative to other low carbon transition options. As a result, there is a 
substantial opportunity (and need) for a private contribution to potential retrofit investment, private 
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investment that will secure private benefit (for example in terms of lower energy costs and 
improved thermal comfort) alongside the shared public benefits of lower GHG emissions and lower 
total energy demand.  The rationale for our review stemmed from the disparity between required 
investment in home energy retrofit given increasingly ambitious public policy targets, and available 
public funds. 
In order to understand how policy can effectively encourage private household investment in 
retrofit, the review first considered evidence on policy efficiency in terms of public investment 
leverage and additionality. We then reflect the wider dependencies of public policymaking in this 
area by reviewing evidence on policy effectiveness in terms of demand-side policy interventions, 
supply-side interventions and overall policy dynamics. Our overall evidence base spanned a mix of 
quantitative evaluations of policy instruments and qualitative assessments of the design and focus of 
policy.  
Over the course of the review, there was a developing awareness of the need for a broadening of 
retrofit policy effectiveness beyond more narrowly defined economic and financial efficiency, to also 
include agency, institutions, and local context. There is a strong case for a broader, holistic approach 
to evidence gathering, as a pre-requisite for effective and durable policy making in this area. 
Government support for retrofit is often associated with multiple (and potentially conflicting) policy 
objectives: climate change policy promotes retrofit as a means of achieving energy savings and 
reduced carbon emissions, while energy affordability policy promotes retrofit as a means of 
achieving warmer living conditions and not necessarily saving energy.  
Another theme that emerged from the review was a tension between policy efficiency and policy 
effectiveness, especially as overall policy ambition grows, and policy interventions diffuse through 
the greater part of all households. These tensions and trade-offs are evident in additionality and 
leverage assessments. How much additional retrofit that policy facilitates is difficult to measure 
accurately with methods such as ex-post, self-report surveys, subject to well-recognised flaws. Even 
so, any particular policy programme is unlikely to facilitate entirely additional measures. A wide 
range of additionality and leverage assessments were encountered in the review. This variety 
reflects different policy designs: whether interventions rely on loans, grants or tax incentives and 
whether they apply universally to all households or whether incentives are targeted at particular 
types of household. 
As would be expected, higher levels of leverage are associated with loan programmes compared to 
non-repayment subsidies such as grants and tax-incentives. Policy instruments with higher private 
funding contributions are, however, less appealing to households and thus may result in less uptake 
and reduced overall retrofit implementation. Households are also less likely to adopt incentives that 
are performance-based rather than fixed, although from the public policy perspective the latter offer 
more efficient use of public funds. Private investment in retrofit can also arise from direct and 
indirect spillover effects, although no evidence was identified here on whether different forms of 
financial incentive facilitate different levels of participant or non-participant spillover.  
Clearly, additionality cannot be the sole metric of retrofit policy effectiveness: a scheme could 
achieve 100% additional retrofit, but result in only minor changes across the housing stock as a 
whole. Narrow focus on maximising additionality may minimise overall retrofit uptake – and lower 
additionality tends to be associated with more commonplace, replacement measures. Retrofit policy 
faces the dilemma of trying to simultaneously maximise additionality, leverage and uptake, and 
rather than any single metric, policy effectiveness in this area should be considered in relation to 
multiple factors (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Factors affecting retrofit investment  policy 
Factors Description  
Available public funding How much public funding is available? 
Level of public subsidy What % of total retrofit investment is covered? 
Take-up of subsidy What % of available public funds are used? 
Additionality What % of retrofit projects subsidised are additional? 
Leverage What is the private to public investment ratio? 
Participant spillover Does the public subsidy result in the subsidised 
household investing in more retrofit at a later date? 
Non-participant 
spillover 
Does the public subsidy scheme result in a stimulus to 
the overall retrofit market?  
 
 The evidence highlights the importance of trigger points, when households are more willing and 
able to carry out retrofit, such as episodes of general renovation or when moving house. Policy 
incentives that are designed around these points will tend to encourage uptake with lower levels of 
subsidy and so achieve higher leverage than would be achieved otherwise. However, whether such 
targeted incentives result in greater additionality is a more open question, and would have to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis.  
Regulations mandating minimum energy performance will typically stimulate both additional and 
non-additional retrofit. Implemented in isolation, regulated standards would not involve a public 
contribution to the direct cost of retrofit, and therefore leverage ratios would not apply. Often, 
however, regulations are introduced alongside a financial support mechanism – a ‘carrots and sticks’ 
approach – and in such cases regulations are likely to improve the additionality of the financial 
incentive. Sufficient monitoring and verification of regulations (and their adequate resourcing), 
should ensure widespread adoption, although evidence suggests that their political acceptability can 
be more challenging. 
Evidence of the effectiveness of information-based policy options such as Energy Performance 
Certificates and face-to-face energy audits is mixed: although they can have some positive impact, 
this is likely to be limited. Rather than judged in isolation, EPCs and audits should be viewed as a 
relevant part of an overall retrofit policy mix, not least as a means of structuring minimum energy 
performance regulation.  
Advocacy of ‘whole house’ retrofit stems from a desire to reduce overall householder costs and 
disruption, but it remains unusual in practice. A home retrofit that occurs episodically over time may 
be more realistic, but from an policy effectiveness and efficiency perspective, it invites consideration 
of whether public financial support is necessary at each episode, and whether higher leverage may 
be possible if the retrofit occurs at a single point.  
Policy that engages with supply side actors offers a means to promote household interest in retrofit 
specifically, but also across the much wider market for general renovation. Supply side policy can 
generate additional retrofit activity via an installer recommending a policy measure, such as a low 
interest loan, or in terms of improved training for installers to help take advantage of retrofit project 
opportunities alongside general renovation. This can be seen as a spillover from non-retrofit to 
retrofit. Supply-side actors can be key catalysts for such wider market spillovers. 
The review considered evidence from a variety of countries / policy contexts, and while it is 
important to recognise that evidence from a particular case is not directly applicable to a different 
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context, some lessons can be drawn from our systematic approach to international evidence 
collection. The success of policy transfer between international contexts depends on a number of 
factors, for example, the existence of comparable institutions and the resources available for 
implementation [23]. The degree to which evidence is transferable depends on the context to which 
it is being transferred.  
Nevertheless, the evidence base reviewed here can also be seen as covering a spectrum of more 
generalizable and more specific / contextual findings. This review does not attempt to 
comprehensively cover all the evidence on the topic and so in our synthesis a greater number of 
sources associated with a finding does not necessarily equate to greater transferability relative to 
other findings. The association of multiple studies with a particular finding, such as the potential 
value in linking retrofit with general renovation, can, however, help to add weight to findings that 
might be of relevance in other contexts. Ultimately however, transferability must be judged on a 
case by case basis.  
Some findings may be more generalizable due to the nature of the finding, regardless of the number 
of associated studies. Certain findings result from more widely applicable mechanisms which may 
mean they are more transferable. For example, the finding that the level of additionality of a retrofit 
programme might partly relate to the type of measure that is funded i.e. replacement or 
supplementary measures, is likely to have wide-ranging applicability (see Table 2). That leverage 
ratios will be affected by whether the programme is focused on priority social groups is likely to also 
be a generalizable finding (see Table 3).  
By contrast, it is likely that more embedded forms of knowledge, such as on homeowner awareness 
of the available energy retrofit options will vary by region. For example, the finding that Danish 
homeowners do not perceive themselves as lacking knowledge on energy efficiency may reflect the 
particular history of energy citizenship in the Danish context [52].  
5. Conclusion 
Understanding private household investment in home energy retrofit invites a distinctive approach 
to systematic evidence review – one able to span the varied economic, social and behavioural 
factors that influence policy effectiveness in this area, and a mixed quantitative and qualitative 
evidence base.  
The review highlighted the varied metrics that can be used to assess the effectiveness of household 
retrofit policy. Any policy that seeks to intervene in a large and indeterminate social system needs to 
be developed with respect to the existing baseline activity and its overall additionality. More 
specifically, policy that seeks to stimulate private investment using public funds, should also be 
assessed in terms of its ability to leverage private investment. Both of these concepts – additionality 
and leverage – help to assess policy effectiveness, but by themselves neither offer a full 
understanding of effectiveness.  
To develop a fuller understanding, this review went beyond international comparative data on 
additionality and leverage, to consider the range of policy interventions addressing actors, 
organisations and social contexts, spanning both demand-side (householder) aspects, and those 
addressing supply-side actors such as installers, retailers and designers. This broadening is important 
as it draws attention to evidence on often neglected aspects of policy effectiveness in this area. Truly 
effective retrofit policy making should involve simultaneous attention to these different aspects – 
despite the tensions and trade-offs involved. Ultimately, an effective policy mix of stability, flexibility 
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and simplicity can promote increased household demand for retrofit and a more responsive supply 
side. 
Like other forms of public policy that seek to change behaviour, retrofit investment policy options 
span a spectrum of measures from persuasion to coercion. There can be no universal optimal 
position on this spectrum – governments of different ideological hues will have different 
orientations in terms of economic distribution and social equity, differences that increasingly affect 
energy policy more widely. Even in such politically contentious areas a broad based, realist version of 
systematic review can help promote evidence-based and effective public policy.   
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